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Introduction 
 
 
European Union Sanctions Against Russia 
Objectives, Impacts and Next Steps 
Sabine Fischer 
The European Union responded to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in March 2014, im-
posing sanctions that have been successively tightened since. Germany was an active 
participant in the process. Sanctions have become a familiar instrument of EU foreign 
policy in recent years. But the measures applied against Russia are unprecedented in 
both target and scope. And they have tangible repercussions on economically stricken 
EU member states. Ultimately, it is by no means certain that sanctions can or will achieve 
their stated goal of changing Russia’s policy vis-à-vis Ukraine. 
 
On 6 March 2014, the heads of state and 
government of the European Union adopted 
a three-stage sanctions mechanism encom-
passing: (1) diplomatic sanctions; (2) “tar-
geted measures” against individuals and 
legal entities, including travel bans and 
freezing of assets in the European Union; 
(3) sectoral economic sanctions. The diplo-
matic measures took effect immediately, 
with the European Union suspending bi-
lateral talks on a new agreement (to replace 
the Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment) and on visa arrangements. 
Targeted sanctions were imposed on 
the first group of (Crimean) Ukrainian and 
Russian actors in March 2014, imports from 
Crimea and Sevastopol banned at the end 
of June. At the end of July the embargo was 
expanded to include investment in infra-
structure and natural resources projects in 
Crimea and loans to Crimea and Sevastopol. 
A ban on firms based within the European 
Union acquiring property and financial 
or service companies there, or offering 
tourism services in Crimea, was added in 
December 2014. Imports from the energy, 
transport and telecommunications sectors 
were also prohibited. The result is complete 
economic isolation of Crimea and Sevasto-
pol from the European Union. 
These sanctions represent the European 
Union’s response to Crimea’s secession from 
Ukraine and its annexation by the Russian 
Federation, which was completed between 
late February and late March 2014. Since 
signing “accession agreements” with the 
two “new federal subjects” on 18 March 
2014, Moscow has moved quickly to inte-
grate them into the Russian state. The issu-
ing of Russian passports to Crimean resi-
dents was accelerated, the Russian military 
presence massively reinforced. At the same 
time the political and human rights situa-
tion of non-Russian (or non-pro-Russian) 
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population groups deteriorated, in par-
ticular that of the Crimean Tatars, who 
represent about 12 percent of the popu-
lation. 
In mid-April 2014 the European Union 
responded to worsening military clashes 
in eastern Ukraine by expanding the list 
of individuals subject to targeted sanctions 
to include Russians and Ukrainians held 
responsible for destabilisation there. Rus-
sian forces had been holding exercises close 
to the Ukrainian border since February. 
In summer 2014 the European Union 
tightened its sanctions in two stages. In 
mid-July it began enforcing sanctions 
against institutions as well as persons. And 
targeted sanctions were expanded to in-
clude those aiding and abetting the actual 
decision-makers. The European Union 
adopted these measures after fighting esca-
lated and all efforts to seek peace had failed. 
Contrary to claims expressed in the Russian 
discourse, the European Union made these 
decisions before the shooting down of Ma-
laysian airliner MH17 on 17 July 2014. That 
event did, however, noticeably accelerate 
the spiral of sanctions. At the end of July 
high-ranking representatives of the Russian 
executive, including several members of 
the National Security Council, leading rep-
resentatives of the intelligence services, Che-
chen President Ramzan Kadyrov and Kras-
nodar Governor Alexander Tkachyov, were 
placed on the list of targeted individuals. 
Finally, at the end of July, the European 
Union also activated the third stage of the 
sanctions mechanism, imposing an arms 
embargo and restricting exports of “dual-
use” goods and equipment required for oil 
exploration and production. It also limited 
access to European Union capital markets 
for a group of Russian banks and companies. 
Citing increasing movements of arms, 
fighters and supplies into Ukraine to sup-
port the rebel offensive, the European Union 
again stepped up its sanctions on 12 Sep-
tember 2014. While Moscow heavily criti-
cised that this move was made despite 
Russia’s agreement to the Minsk cease-fire 
protocol of 5 September 2014, the Euro-
pean Union regarded the new sanctions as 
a response to the rebel offensive launched 
with Russian support in August. 
There were no more new sanctions 
against Russia until the second half of Janu-
ary 2015, when another escalation in fight-
ing war led the European Union to expand 
its sanctions list again. It also extended the 
sanctions imposed in March 2014 until Sep-
tember 2015. Two deputy defence ministers 
and the deputy chief of the Russian general 
staff were now also added to the group of 
targeted individuals. 
Thus between March 2014 and February 
2015 the European Union activated all three 
stages of the sanctions mechanism adopted 
in March 2014. The shooting down of MH17 
– for which to this day no independent in-
stance has unequivocally attributed respon-
sibility – had a decisive influence on scep-
tical member states. The European Union’s 
sanctions policy is closely coordinated with 
Washington. The United States targeted 
oligarchs close to Putin earlier and more 
comprehensively, and American financial 
sanctions have a greater international effect 
because Washington also punishes viola-
tions by non-American banks. Obama’s 
sanctions policy operates under strong 
domestic pressure, because many Republi-
cans and a number of Democrats in both 
houses of Congress demand a harder line, 
up to and including supplying arms to 
Ukraine. 
The European Union accuses Russia of 
an aggressive policy aiming to destabilise 
Ukraine. It ties sanctions to demands for a 
political resolution based on the preserva-
tion and restoration of Ukraine’s independ-
ence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
This fundamental demand is laid out 
in detail in the sanction decisions: Russia 
should reverse the annexation of Crimea 
and Sevastopol, prevent supplies, arms 
and illegal fighters crossing the border to 
Ukraine, and use its influence to persuade 
the rebels in Donetsk and Lugansk to back 
down. Above all, the Kremlin should imple-
ment the Minsk agreements of September 
2014 and February 2015. 
SWP Comments 17 
March 2015 
2 
From the European Union’s perspective, as 
laid out in official documents, the purposes 
of sanctions include furthering the objec-
tives of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), such as establishing and pre-
serving peace, and responding to violations 
of democratic governance, human rights 
and international law. Embedded in a 
broader political strategy, EU sanctions are 
not generally supposed to “punish” but to 
influence the policies and actions of the 
targeted country, organisation or individ-
uals. Where possible, sanctions should be 
tailored to affect those responsible and 
avoid negative repercussions on the broader 
population. In the case of the sanctions im-
posed on Russia, it is hoped that pressure 
from outside (diplomatic and economic 
restrictions) and inside (through actors 
affected by sanctions) will change the cost-
benefit calculations of the political leaders 
and force them to pursue a more construc-
tive policy in Ukraine. 
The ideas about the purpose of sanctions 
circulating in political debates within EU 
member states and the United States are 
more diffuse. The spectrum ranges from ex-
plicit change in conflict behaviour through 
to what would essentially mean the replace-
ment of the Russian political leadership. 
There is also uncertainty as to how to move 
forward on sanctions. Initial discussion of 
this question was obscured at the begin-
ning of 2015 by the renewed escalation in 
eastern Ukraine and the increasingly heated 
controversy over arms supplies. 
The Impact of Sanctions 
The sanctions are having diverse effects on 
the political, economic and social situation 
in Russia. 
The Russian leadership’s official reading 
corresponds to its dominant narrative about 
the West: The Ukraine crisis represents the 
(provisional) culmination of decades of 
Western striving for global hegemony, dur-
ing which the United States and NATO, and 
increasingly also the European Union, had 
steadily encroached into the post-Soviet 
space. Regime change of the kind seen in 
Ukraine in February 2014 is regarded as 
an outcome of policies essentially directed 
against Russia. The sanctions, too, are inter-
preted as one instrument of a broad-based 
Western strategy seeking to weaken Russia. 
From that perspective, the events in Ukraine 
are nothing but an excuse used by the West 
to exert pressure and ultimately to bring 
about regime change in Moscow. In this 
interpretation the American and European 
sanctions originate from an aggressive, 
illegitimate and counterproductive policy 
where Russia finds itself in a purely defen-
sive position. 
Moscow also perceives the Western sanc-
tions as a product of American unilateral-
ism, where Washington had forced the 
other EU member states to pursue a policy 
that contradicted their interests. That yet 
again demonstrates, they say, the weakness 
of the European Union and the dominance 
of the United States in transatlantic rela-
tions. Most recently Germany has also been 
accused of exploiting sanctions and geo-
political tensions to advance its own eco-
nomic agenda in the region without regard 
to Russia. 
 
The Russian economy stands at the cusp of 
recession. In fact structural problems were 
boding ill the country’s economic growth 
some time before the geopolitical crisis of 
2014. And the collapse of the global oil 
price in the second half of 2014 hit Russia’s 
economy hard. Sectoral economic sanctions 
further accelerated the crisis, above all the 
financial measures that deprive affected 
Russian banks and corporations of an im-
portant source of refinancing for their 
external debt. This in turn affects the Rus-
sian state, which has already begun tapping 
the reserve funds built up during the boom 
to come to the aid of individual banks and 
corporations. If the oil price remains low 
and sanctions are maintained (or tightened), 
a serious erosion of these reserves will en-
sue. This could potentially affect the Rus-
sian state’s ability to meet its obligations 
in a wide range of areas from pensions and 
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social security to the military budget. The 
restrictions on technology transfer in the 
oil industry endanger the ability of Russian 
energy firms to open up new fields and 
increase production. 
The indirect consequences of crisis and 
sanctions are also grave. Foreign invest-
ment – including German – fell noticeably 
in 2014, and trade with Western partners 
shrank tangibly. At the same time capital 
flight grew. Accelerated by sanctions, Rus-
sia’s economic decline has massive impacts 
on neighbouring economies. While the col-
lapse of the Russian rouble was only partly 
a product of sanctions, it reinforced the 
public impression of crisis, as did the sharp 
increase in food prices caused by Russian 
counter-sanctions. 
Within Russia there is a range of views 
about the economic difficulties caused by 
sanctions. Government representatives tend 
to play down the effect of sanctions on the 
economy. Certain members of the political 
elite who were already calling for more pro-
tectionism and even economic autarchy 
feel vindicated. Security and power clearly 
come before considerations of economic 
rationality. While there are certainly nu-
merous experts who do analyse the effects 
of sanctions in the context of structural 
weakness of the Russian economy and the 
collapse of the oil price, and sharply criti-
cise the actions of the Russian government, 
they have little influence and stand outside 
the political decision-making processes. 
 
Sanctions imposed against individuals 
seek to shield the mass of the population 
of the targeted country while hoping that 
the affected members of the political and 
economic elite will exercise pressure on the 
top political leadership to bring about a lift-
ing of the sanctions and thus relieve their 
position. However, political processes in 
Russia are so opaque that it is extremely 
difficult to find evidence for such causali-
ties. The public response of the affected 
Russian actors certainly does not point in 
the desired direction: They declare their 
appearance on Westerns sanctions lists as 
patriotic solidarity with the fatherland and 
its political leadership, emphasising that 
they do not own assets in any EU country 
anyway and are therefore not seriously 
affected. Given that the Kremlin has long 
been calling for the repatriation of foreign 
assets, sanctions offered those targeted an 
opportunity to prove their loyalty. One good 
example is the Russian oligarch Arkady 
Rotenberg, who was placed on the sanc-
tions list in July 2014 after one of his com-
panies was hired to build a bridge between 
Crimea and the Russian mainland. As the 
newspaper RBK reported in February 2015, 
Rotenberg is the only Russian business-
man known to have suffered actual losses, 
through the freezing of his assets in Italy. 
At the same time, he publicly declared that 
he had consciously accepted the sanctions 
to make “his contribution to national devel-
opment” (kommersant.ru, 30 January 2015). 
In the Russian power vertical the sanctions 
appear – to date at least – not to visibly 
weaken the principle of rents for loyalty. 
 
The perception within society reflects the 
official narrative. In December 2014 67 per-
cent of respondents in a survey by the inde-
pendent Levada Centre said that the main 
motivation behind the West’s policy on 
Crimea and eastern Ukraine was hostility 
and a wish to seize the moment to exert 
pressure on Russia. Only 12 percent asso-
ciated the West’s actions with the idea that 
Russia had annexed foreign territory and 
violated international law. 
The Russian leadership continues to 
enjoy the support of an overwhelming 
majority of the population. In January 69 
percent said that Russia should maintain 
its policies regardless of sanctions, while 
30 to 35 percent agreed with the respective 
Russian options of imposing counter-sanc-
tions, intensifying relations with China, 
India and the Middle East, or ignoring the 
West’s actions and sticking to its present 
domestic and foreign policy course. Only 
10 percent wanted more compromise over 
foreign policy. The proportion who said 
they already noticed significant effects of 
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sanctions was not particularly high in 
January 2015 (34 percent) but had risen 
considerably since September 2014 (16 per-
cent). The proportion who expected further 
personal repercussions in the future also 
rose from 26 percent in September 2014 
to 47 percent in January 2015. Perceptions 
of the European Union’s motives changed 
strongly in the second half of 2014. In May 
2014 63 percent still believed that the sanc-
tions were directed against a small circle 
of actors responsible for Russian policy in 
Ukraine, and only 24 percent said that they 
targeted the broader Russian population. 
By December 2014 the figures had reversed 
(29 percent and 62 percent respectively). 
These figures demonstrate how strongly 
public perceptions are influenced by official 
interpretations. The European Union has 
thus far failed to plausibly explain the mo-
tives behind its sanctions to Russian society. 
Official propaganda can consequently re-
inforce the population’s belief that Western 
sanctions are aiming to weaken and destroy 
Russia. This in turn promotes a siege men-
tality that is reflected in President Putin’s 
still buoyant approval ratings. The fact that 
a clear majority of the population plainly 
no longer regards the sanctions as “targeted” 
contravenes a fundamental principle of the 
European Union’s policy and will further 
hamper communication on the matter. 
A Mixed Balance 
Before taking further decisions it is impor-
tant to investigate the effect of the sanc-
tions, distinguishing between intended and 
unintended effects. 
The balance for intended effects is thin. 
There is no sign of Moscow giving up Crimea 
and Sevastopol, Kiev does not control the 
Russian-Ukrainian border, and fighters and 
supplies continue to cross it. Instead of con-
tributing to an implementation of the Minsk 
cease-fire agreement of 5 September 2014, 
the Kremlin permitted (or fuelled) another 
escalation in January 2015. Realisation of 
the Minsk package of measures of 12 Feb-
ruary 2012 hangs by a thread. While the 
chronology might suggest that internation-
al pressure in August/September 2014 and 
January/February 2015 prevented expansion 
of the war zone and encouraged the respec-
tive Minsk agreements, this is difficult to 
prove empirically. 
There has to date been no recognisable 
shift in views on the conflict or change 
in the cost-benefit calculation within the 
Russian leadership, nor in the rest of the 
population. On the contrary, the events 
in Ukraine and their treatment in Russian 
propaganda have strengthened support 
for the regime on the basis of loyalty and 
nationalist conservative and anti-Western 
attitudes. This unintended effect was, 
incidentally, predictable. 
In Russia’s power vertical, which is ex-
tremely concentrated on the person of the 
president, three factors undermine the in-
tended effect of the Western sanctions: 
(1) The progressive disconnection of state 
and society over a period of years has foster-
ed social passivity. Communication between 
the two functions only in one direction: The 
state imposes its interpretations of events 
at home and abroad on society, while soci-
ety has no channels left to convey criticism 
or wish for change to the state. 
(2) Systematic marginalisation and 
repression means that opposition can be 
expressed only far from the political main-
stream. This applies both to parties and 
to experts with deviating views. Critical 
debates, for example on the causes and 
objectives of sanctions, do occur, but they 
reach neither society nor the political elite. 
(3) The narrow concentration of the 
political decision-making process isolates 
its centre from the weak societal and expert 
discourses and reduces the number of op-
tions that can be taken into consideration. 
Filtered through such authoritarian struc-
tures, the effect of the sanctions is in some 
respects counterintuitive. They in fact am-
plify the already enormous impact of the 
crisis on the domestic political situation in 
Russia, in aspects ranging from the drastic 
heightening of authoritarian tendencies in 
the political system to the emergence of 
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such a fractious atmosphere in society 
that violence against dissenters is at least 
enabled if not in fact encouraged. The mur-
der of opposition politician Boris Nemtsov 
at the end of February 2015 could turn 
out to be the beginning of a series rather 
than the tragic culmination of this devel-
opment. 
One more or less unforeseeable unin-
tended effect is the broad socio-economic 
impact of sanctions in combination with 
structural economic crisis and the collapse 
of the oil price. In the interpretation of the 
political leadership and the perception of 
the population, the Western measures have 
long been directed not against individuals 
but against the country as a whole. This 
creates a dilemma for the European Union. 
The specifics of the Russian political system 
mean that the danger of social and political 
destabilisation is great if the economy does 
indeed collapse under the triple pressure 
of structural crisis, falling oil price and con-
tinuing sanctions. In view of the predomi-
nant political attitudes among the popu-
lation and the political elites, this could 
have further absolutely negative domestic 
political consequences. Although the Euro-
pean Union does not see itself pursuing a 
policy of regime change, it is increasingly 
perceived as doing exactly that by the Rus-
sian population. 
Even if there is little sign of the intended 
effects of sanctions outweighing their nega-
tive unintended consequences, Moscow’s 
massive violation of international law left 
the European Union with no option but to 
act. As the situation escalated and diplo-
matic efforts repeatedly failed, there was 
no valid political alternative to sanctions. 
Alongside seeking to change Russian 
behaviour in the Ukraine crisis, the sanc-
tions also possess an important communi-
cative function. They signalise that the 
European Union is able to deploy far-reach-
ing non-military instruments in consensus 
and to stand up for its values and princi-
ples. That is an important message to the 
Russian political elite, but also to Ukraine, 
other states in the European Union’s neigh-
bourhood and – not to be forgotten – the 
EU member states themselves. 
Where Now with Sanctions? 
Four recommendations can be made for 
moving forward: 
1.  The European Union’s position on 
sanctions must be both strong and trans-
parent. It must make clear that it is not 
pursuing regime change, and that sanc-
tions are directed solely towards a resolu-
tion of the Ukraine conflict. That also 
includes clear communication about the 
conditions under which sanctions will 
be relaxed or tightened. 
2.  Deeds must follow. Moscow is not 
going to reverse the annexation of Crimea 
and Sevastopol in the foreseeable future. 
So measures tied to that question must be 
maintained. But if Russia contributes tan-
gibly to de-escalation in the Donbas, the 
European Union should respond by relax-
ing sanctions imposed in that connection. 
Given that Republican majorities in both 
houses of Congress will leave the Obama 
Administration little leeway for flexibility 
in the time it has left, there needs to be open 
and critical discussion between Washing-
ton, Brussels and Berlin on their sanctions 
policies, in order to avoid endangering 
transatlantic cooperation. This would also 
be especially important if the war were to 
escalate. 
3.  In that event the European Union 
and the United States would have to expand 
their sanctions. The greatest potential is 
offered by enlarging the targeted restrictive 
measures against individuals and entities. 
If the aforementioned broad impact on the 
Russian population is to be avoided the pos-
sibilities for sectoral measures are already 
restricted, as are measures directed against 
economic infrastructure, such as excluding 
Russia from the international payments sys-
tem (SWIFT). In the event of further escala-
tion, targeted measures would have to be 
applied determinedly against a wider group 
of decisive political and economic actors 
in Russia. The action would need to be con-
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ducted incrementally in order to leave 
room for a continuing response to and 
further escalation. 
4.  Despite the difficult conditions, the 
European Union must improve its commu-
nication with Russian society in order – to 
the extent that this is possible, – to counter-
act the perception that its policies are anti-
Russian and aggressive. Various possibilities 
are available here, from intensifying media 
work to unilateral steps to improve mobility. 
With its diverse societal relations with Rus-
sia, Germany could take a lead. 
In the medium to long term sanctions 
are likely to remain an element of relations 
between the European Union and Russia. 
But the sanctions policy can only have a po-
sitive influence on the situation in Ukraine 
and the region as a whole if it is embedded 
into a broader political strategy towards 
Eastern Europe. Wherever possible, this must 
include diplomatic initiatives addressed to 
Russia. It must be hoped that the situation 
in Donbas will have stabilised properly by 
the end of 2015. Then Germany could use 
its position as chair of the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
in 2016 to revive the discussion with Russia 
over pan-European security. But there is 
also an equally strong need for intense po-
litical, economic and also security engage-
ment in Ukraine and the other eastern 
partners in order to stabilise them and the 
entire region from within. 
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